

Coalition québécoise pour le contrôle du tabac

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AN OVERVIEW OF TOBACCO INDUSTRY TACTICS

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1) DECEPTIONS :

According to its own documents, the tobacco industry has deliberately hidden from the public that it has known since the 1960s that smoking causes disease, that nicotine is addictive and that companies manipulate nicotine levels in cigarettes to increase addiction.

- On April 14, 1994, the CEOs of the seven biggest tobacco companies testified before the U.S. House of Representatives' *Health and Environment Subcommittee* that nicotine is not addictive and that their companies had never manipulated nicotine levels in cigarettes.¹ One month later, Dr. Stanton Glantz of the University of California received from an informer 4,000 pages of internal documents from the third largest U.S. tobacco company, **Brown & Williamson (B&W)**. These documents show that the industry: 1) has known since 1963 that tobacco causes cancer, emphysema and cardiovascular diseases, 2) knows that nicotine is addictive and regards cigarettes as nicotine dispensers, and 3) has willingly covered up these findings by denying their existence.²
- When tobacco companies were forced to list the ingredients in cigarettes, it was discovered that toxic substances like ammonia were being added to tobacco to increase the release of nicotine into the lungs.³
- **B&W** owns a patent of a tobacco plant called Y-1 that has twice the usual level of nicotine, owing to genetic engineering.⁴
- Through the selection of leaves that are richer in nicotine, genetic engineering and the addition of other ingredients, the industry has raised nicotine levels in Canadian cigarettes by 53% since 1968.⁵

2) FRONT GROUPS:

Through their own surveys, tobacco manufacturers know that public knowledge of their involvement in the opposition to an anti-smoking measure actually boosts public support for it.⁶ The tobacco industry therefore creates or funds front groups to act in its stead. These groups help shift attention away from the harmful effects of cigarettes and towards a debate in which smokers and other stakeholders are the targets⁷.

- The **Coalition québécoise pour la justice en taxation du tabac**, which advocated a decrease in cigarette taxes in 1993-1994, was founded by tobacco manufacturers; its spokesperson, Michel Gadbois, was a former public relations officer for **Imasco**, the parent company of **Imperial Tobacco**.⁸
- The **Mouvement pour l'abolition des taxes réservées aux cigarettes (MATRAC)** was also an instrument used by the tobacco industry to lower cigarette taxes.⁹ **MATRAC** worked out of the offices of the **Quebec Food Retailers' Association**, of which the tobacco companies are members and financial contributors; the **QFRA** president at the time was, again, Michel Gadbois (see above point).¹⁰
- The **Alliance for Sponsorship Freedom**, launched in 1996, claims to represent 200 cultural and sporting events that oppose a ban on tobacco sponsorship. Yet behind the scenes, the **Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council** funds the **Alliance** while **Imperial Tobacco's** Public relations R firm, **Edelman Worldwide**, organizes its campaigns.¹¹ This organization is similar to the **Coalition 51**, which in the late eighties fought restrictions on tobacco-related advertising and sponsorship—and was allegedly bankrolled by **Benson & Hedges**.¹²

¹ *Tobacco Control*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1994.

² Special communications, *Journal of the American Medical Association*, Vol. 274, No. 3, June 19, 1995.

³ Kessler, D.A., "The Control and Manipulation of Nicotine in Tobacco," *Tobacco Control*, 3: 362-369, 1994.

⁴ Kessler, D.A., "The Control and Manipulation of Nicotine in Tobacco," *Tobacco Control*, 3: 362-369, 1994.

⁵ Ricker, W.S., *Nicotine in Whole Tobacco and Tobacco Smoke*, Labstat, March 1995.

⁶ Tobacco Institute Survey, California 1982, quoted in *JAMA*, Vol. 270, No. 4, July 28, 1993.

⁷ Samuels, B., et S.A. Glantz, « The Politics of Local Tobacco Control », *JAMA*, vol. 266, 16 octobre 1991

⁸ Noël, André, "La Route du tabac : Quand les médias se font complices," *Le 30*, Vol. 18, No. 4, April 1994.

⁹ Auger, Michel, "Fournisseurs du MATRAC : Le Ministère fédéral de la Justice oublie tout," *Journal de Montréal*, June 13, 1993.

¹⁰ Noël, André, "La Route du tabac : Quand les médias se font complices," *Le 30*, Vol. 18, No. 4, April 1994.

¹¹ Marie-Josée Lapointe, spokesperson, Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers Council, quoted in : Andrew Cash, « Bying off the Arts », *NOW*, October 3-9, 1996

¹² John Rainford, "Dingwall Should Take on Tobacco Industry's Campaign", *The Hill Times*, October 7, 1996

- The **Smokers' Freedom Society**, which in 1993 claimed to represent six million Canadian smokers, was primarily funded by Canadian manufacturers.¹³ It had no members nor financial statements available to the public and its spokesmen were "paid volunteers".¹⁴
- The **National Smokers' Alliance**, which claims to defend the rights of the tens of millions of smokers in the United States, is funded by **Philip Morris** and run by its public relations firm.¹⁵
- By giving away promotional goods, **Philip Morris** acquires the personal addresses of millions of smokers and use them to fuel its "grass-roots movements": it currently has a database of over 26 million names. For example, in February 1994, four million people joined in the *Marlboro Adventure Team* promotion, receiving more than 14 million promotional items. The campaign, the largest in marketing history, cost the company \$250 million.¹⁶
- Since 1993, **RJR** has employed a firm to create "grass-roots movements" against anti-smoking initiatives across North America. After sending out hundreds of invitations promising free merchandise, "field coordinators" would bring together one or two dozen smokers, usually more interested in the free products than issues, and provide them with sample letters to public officials, petitions and agendas for meetings.¹⁷
- In New York, **Philip Morris** used a telemarketing company to distort the impact of an anti-smoking measure and encourage smokers to protest. The company gave smokers precise instructions, transferred their calls directly to the offices of the appropriate authorities and monitored the conversations.¹⁸
- To fight against smoke-free restaurants ordinances in the U.S., the tobacco industry has created phony restaurant associations that have no offices, phone numbers or membership lists and whose only purpose is to oppose anti-smoking measures. These front groups include **Restaurants for a Sensible and Voluntary Policy**, the **United Restaurant, Hotel, Tavern Association** (Albany) and the **Manhattan Tavern and Restaurant Association**.¹⁹ They use misleading studies alleging sales losses in restaurants that have introduced smoking restrictions.²⁰
- The tobacco industry also supports organizations whose demands, without being specifically pro-smoking, favour the tobacco industry.²¹ Since 1990, for example, the industry has been fighting cigarette taxes by creating or funding anti-tax and anti-government movements such as the **National Coalition Against Crime and Tobacco Smuggling** (U.S.),²² **San Franciscans Against Government Intrusion**,²³ **Citizens Against Tax Abuse and Government Waste** (Colorado), **Michigan Citizens for Fair Taxes** (Michigan), **Citizens for a Sound Economy** (New Jersey) and the **National Taxpayers Union** (U.S.)²⁴. A representative from **RJR** says, "You didn't have to defend your position on tobacco because a tax is a tax is a tax to these guys. They don't care what it is."²⁵

3) ABETTING A CRISIS:

The 1993 contraband cigarette crisis in Quebec was a component of a public relations campaign devised by the industry to fight the tobacco tax hike.²⁶

- According to the U.S. Justice Department, the Montreal company **Imperial Tobacco** was involved in cigarette smuggling in 1993-1994. On May 23, 1996, criminal charges were laid against 10 people, including a sales director from **Brown & Williamson**; according to the affidavit, negotiations were conducted by an employee of **Imperial Tobacco** with the full knowledge of one of the company's senior executives.²⁷

¹³ Bryan, J., "Pro-smokers' Group Founded with Help from Tobacco Firms," *The Gazette*, September 4, 1996.

¹⁴ National Campaign for Action on Tobacco.

¹⁵ Smokefree Educational Services, 1994.

¹⁶ *Tobacco-Free Youth Reporter*, Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco, Summer 1994.

¹⁷ Stone, Peter H., "The Nicotine Network," *Mother Jones*, May-June 1996.

¹⁸ Press release, NYC Coalition for a Smoke-Free City, December 10, 1994.

¹⁹ Smokefree Educational Services, 1994.

²⁰ Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights, *What to Expect from the Tobacco Industry*, 1992.

²¹ Victor Crawford, former lobbyist for the Tobacco Institute, quoted in *JAMA*, Vol. 274, No. 3, July 1995.

²² Stauber, J.C., "Front Groups Do Tobacco's Dirty Work," adapted from *PR Watch*, Vol. 1, No. 4; *Tobacco-Free Youth Reporter*, Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco, Fall 1994.

²³ Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights, *What to Expect from the Tobacco Industry* 1992.

²⁴ Stone, Peter H., "The Nicotine Network"; Gup, Ted, "Fakin' It"; Dreyfuss, Robert and Jeanne Brokaw, "The Campaign Against the States," *Mother Jones*, May-June 1996.

²⁵ Stone, Peter H., "The Nicotine Network"; Gup, Ted, "Fakin' It"; Dreyfuss, Robert and Jeanne Brokaw, "The Campaign Against the States," *Mother Jones*, May-June 1996.

²⁶ Noël, André, "La Route du tabac : Quand les médias se font complices," *Le 30*, Vol. 18, No. 4, April 1994.

²⁷ United States District Council, Western Kentucky, District of Louisville, Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant, September 1, 1995, p. 6; Noël, André, "Imperial Tobacco accusée de contrebande de tabac," *La Presse*, May 24, 1996.

- **MATRAC** (see Section 2) organized illegal cigarette sales in order to force the government to lower taxes; these efforts were funded in great part by the tobacco industry.²⁸
- In 1988, exports from Quebec cigarette companies to the United States amounted to \$25 million. In 1993, the year tobacco smuggling “from the United States” reached its peak, Canadian exports topped \$500 million.²⁹

4) PHONY CONCESSIONS:

When the tobacco industry supports tobacco restrictions or makes concessions, they are usually formulated to work to the industry's advantage.

- Tobacco manufacturers have many times launched variations of their “*It's the Law*” campaigns ostensibly aimed at retailers in order to reduce illegal cigarette sales to minors, the latest example having occurred in October 1996. These campaigns usually appear when effective legislative measures are being considered by the government, and they help the industry:
 - 1) prevent the passage of the legislation by allowing manufacturers to claim that they can govern themselves;
 - 2) continue sales to minors, because these campaigns are largely ineffective³⁰, for retailer participation is voluntary (a typical rate of participation: 4.6% in Massachusetts) and the only independent evaluation has shown that an almost identical number of participants still sell to minors (86%), compared with non-participants (88%);³¹
 - 3) obtain free publicity, because they send the message to youths that they have to wait until they are 18 in order to be able to buy cigarettes, as if it were something desirable—and not something to avoid.³² According to the **Canadian Tobacco Manufacturer's Council**, “*It's cool ... That's why they (teenagers) smoke – because we (adults) tell them they shouldn't smoke.*”³³ (These campaigns never mention the health risks of smoking.)
- The tobacco industry claims to support anti-smoking campaigns aimed at teenagers because smoking, it says, is an “adult custom.” But it knows full well that this approach, in addition to distracting attention from the health hazards of smoking, helps portray smoking as “one of the few initiations into the adult world” and an “illicit pleasure”—a stated aim of its ad campaigns.³⁴
- Canadian tobacco manufacturers have adopted a voluntary advertising code, claiming that regulations are unnecessary. The code professes to avoid directing advertising “to persons other than adult consumers of tobacco products”.³⁵ Nevertheless, their advertising makes use of popular athletes, rock stars and slogans glorifying independence and rebellion.³⁶ In addition, when violations of the code were reported, for example regarding advertising near schools, manufacturers have more than once modified the code—instead of preventing more violations.³⁷ Health Canada describes the code as “illusory, unenforceable and riddled with loopholes.”³⁸
- The industry has sometimes supported legislation prohibiting sales to minors. But in such cases, it has usually made sure that the measures are difficult or impossible to enforce. For example: 1) only the buyers (kids) can be penalized, and not the sellers (retailers), thereby allowing retailers to continue selling illegally to minors; 2) it must be proven that a merchant “knowingly” sold tobacco to a minor (the courts have dismissed related cases on the basis that one cannot prove what a person knows); 3) using minors to conduct checks is prohibited, which makes compliance checks impossible.³⁹
- When the industry backed a smoking ban in elevators in Maryland, it made sure its enforcement was virtually impossible. A fine could be laid only when an offender lit up in an elevator under a large sign that clearly prohibited smoking, in the presence of an officer, dressed in full uniform. Such a scenario was, of course, rather unlikely.⁴⁰

²⁸ Auger, Michel, “Fournisseurs du MATRAC : Le Ministère fédéral de la Justice oublie tout,” *Journal de Montréal*, June 13, 1993.

²⁹ Noël, André, “La Route du tabac : Quand les médias se font complices,” *Le 30*, Vol. 18, No. 4, April 1994.

³⁰ *Appliquer les leçons tirées de l'expérience américaine à la campagne d'information des marchands financée par l'industrie du tabac*, Société canadienne du cancer, August 1994

³¹ DiFranza, J., *The Tobacco Institute's "It's the Law" Campaign: Has It Halted Illegal Sales of Tobacco to Children?*, *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 82, No. 9, September 1992

³² *Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco: A Community Organizer's Manual*, Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco, 1992

³³ Marie-Josée Lapointe, spokesperson for the Canadian Tobacco Manufacturers' Council, cited in “MD warns of smoking time bomb”, *The Gazette*, November 15, 1996.

³⁴ Editorial, *American Journal of Public Health*, Vol. 86, No. 2, February 1996.

³⁵ *The Tobacco Industry Voluntary Packaging and Advertising Code*, December 19, 1995.

³⁶ Document sent to the prime minister by eight national health agencies, June 1996.

³⁷ Bueckert, Dennis, Canadian Press, “Cigarette Makers Change Ad Rules After Complaints,” *The Gazette*, June 6, 1996.

³⁸ McKenna, Barrie, “New Tobacco Ad Limit Urged,” *The Globe and Mail*, June 1, 1996.

³⁹ DiFranza, J. and B. Godshall, “Special Report: Tobacco Industry Lobbies to Sabotage Synar Law,” *Tobacco-Free Youth Reporter*, Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco, Fall 1994.

⁴⁰ Victor Crawford, former lobbyist for the Tobacco Institute, quoted in *JAMA*, Vol. 274, No. 3, July 1995.

5) INTIMIDATION TACTICS:

The industry has at its disposal hundreds of law firms, billions of dollars and all the time it needs to fight its opponents in court. What's more, it uses the most powerful lobby in history⁴¹ to discourage anyone—victims, journalists, doctors, politicians—from standing up to manufacturers.

- In the United States, nearly 200 law firms are currently working on more than 25 major tobacco cases.⁴² The company responsible for the industry's public relations and lobbying, the **Tobacco Institute**, spends over \$20 million a year, employs 120 PR professionals and is described as one of the "most formidable public relations/lobbying machines in history"⁴³.
- In 1994, **Philip Morris** filed a \$10 billion lawsuit against the television network **ABC** in connection with a *Day One* broadcast on the manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes. In order to avoid a long and costly battle, the network decided to settle out of court. **Philip Morris** subsequently conceived ads that misrepresented **ABC's** decision as an admission that their report was false, which was not the case. In an unprecedented move, another network, **CBS** then pulled the plug on a tobacco report under production for fear of a similar litigation, even though no threats had been made.⁴⁴
- In 1993 **Philip Morris** sued the *Environmental Protection Agency* for citing secondary smoke as a carcinogen.⁴⁵
- In current lawsuits regarding the manipulation of nicotine levels in cigarettes, Minnesota state lawyers requested specific information from the industry. The industry responded by sending them truckloads of documents on mostly irrelevant topics. According to the presiding judge, if the state lawyers worked 12 hours a day, five days a week, they'd need nine years to sort through the nine million pages delivered.⁴⁶ In the lawsuit against **ABC**, **Philip Morris** sent the network's lawyers one million pages on red paper, a colour which cannot be photocopied.⁴⁷
- When a former **B&W** researcher, Jeffrey Wigand, became one of the most important witnesses against the industry, the company hired two public relations consultants to assemble and distribute to both media and politicians a 500-page dossier containing "a smorgasbord of allegations, large and small" intended to ruin his reputation.⁴⁸

6) BUYING SILENCE AND ALLIES:

Financial dependence has often suppressed objective stands on tobacco-related issues by organizations that receive money from the tobacco industry.⁴⁹

- Although the U.S. *Surgeon General* condemned cigarette smoking in 1964, the *American Medical Association* refused to endorse this position for the nine years during which it received \$18 million from the industry to subsidize a research program on tobacco.⁵⁰
- In the 1970s, cigarette advertising doubled in *Time* and *Newsweek* while the number of articles on smoking and health fell more than 60%. When national medical associations submitted special supplements on health, both magazines removed every reference to the dangers of smoking, without the associations' approval⁵¹. And in the 1980s, when *Newsweek* finally published an article on the non-smokers' rights movement, **RJR** withdrew its advertising, resulting in a loss of revenue of up to \$1 million an issue.⁵²
- A study of 10 leading women's magazines showed that those who refuse cigarette advertising published 4 to 21 times more articles on smoking and health.⁵³

⁴¹ *Public Relation Journal*, quoted by Stauber, J. and S. Rampton, *Smokin'!*, Internet, November 22-29, 1995; *Tobacco Control*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1994.

⁴² Brenner, Marie, "The Man Who Knew Too Much," *Vanity Fair*, May 1996.

⁴³ *Public Relation Journal*, quoted by Stauber, J. and S. Rampton, *Smokin'!*, Internet, November 22-29, 1995; *Tobacco Control*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1994.

⁴⁴ Brenner, Marie, "The Man Who Knew Too Much," *Vanity Fair*, May 1996.

⁴⁵ Rosenblatt, R., "How Do They Live with Themselves?" *New York Times Magazine*, March 1994.

⁴⁶ Associated Press, "U.S. Ruling Gives Smokers Key Databases for Lawsuits," *The Gazette*, May 29, 1996.

⁴⁷ Brenner, Marie, "The Man Who Knew Too Much," *Vanity Fair*, May 1996.

⁴⁸ Brenner, Marie, "The Man Who Know Too Much," *Vanity Fair*, May 1996.

⁴⁹ Warner, K., "Cigarette Advertising and Media Coverage of Smoking and Health," *New England Journal of Medicine*, February 1985.

⁵⁰ Wiener, John, "The Cigarette Papers," *The Nation*, January 1, 1996.

⁵¹ Tye, Joe, "Buying Silence: Self-censorship of Smoking and Health in National Newsweeklies," *Tobacco and Youth Reporter*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1989; Kluger, Richard, *Ashes to Ashes: America's Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1996.

⁵² Warner, K., "Cigarette Advertising and Media Coverage of Smoking and Health," *New England Journal of Medicine*, February 1985.

⁵³ Warner, K., "Cigarette Advertising and Media Coverage of Smoking and Health," *New England Journal of Medicine*, February 1985.

- To polish its image and soften the opposition, the industry donates to benevolent organizations, some of which treat victims of tobacco or work with young people. For example, in 1994, **Imasco** contributed to the foundations of some 20 Quebec hospitals, the *Canadian Red Cross Society*, the *Society of Toxicology of Canada*, the *Canadian Breast Cancer Foundation*, *Mtl Centraide*, *Canada World Youth*, the *Refuge pour jeunes de Mtl*, the *Fondation Scoute A.S.C.*, the Mtl YWCA and YMCA.⁵⁴
- An organization like the **Alliance for Sponsorship Freedom** (see Section 2), organized and funded by the tobacco industry, prevents its members in the arts and sports communities from considering alternatives to tobacco sponsorship. The industry's objective is to maintain tobacco sponsorship, not to ensure the survival of cultural or sports events.

7) SCIENTIFIC FRAUD:

Despite its own studies recognizing the harm caused by its products, to both smokers and non-smokers, the tobacco industry continues to discredit legitimate scientific research⁵⁵ while it funds or promotes research that corroborates its own views.

- Following a recommendation from its public relations specialists, the U.S. tobacco industry created the **Council for Tobacco Research** to present itself as a board of scientists, and whose purpose is to "sponsor a public relations campaign" that was entirely "pro-cigarette"⁵⁶ (see Section 5).
- When the tobacco industry funds university research, its lawyers and executives take part in the projects selection. This approach is a violation of normal scientific procedures requiring that proposals be reviewed by scientists. Professors who receive grants from the industry must also report their findings to it before seeking publication—which is, again, counter to standard procedures.⁵⁷
- In order to create an appearance of scientific controversy over the health effects of environmental tobacco smoke (ETS), the tobacco industry mounts worldwide public relations campaigns⁵⁸ (just as it had previously done to deny the dangers of smoking),⁵⁹ citing industry funded, non-peer-reviewed publications⁶⁰. For example, the tobacco industry organizes "scientific" symposiums, like the *International Symposium at McGill University* in 1989,⁶¹ for which it rented space on the university campus and selected the 82 participants who would comment on the issue of ETS.
- Among the studies the industry uses to play down the risks of secondhand smoke is a recent European "scientific" study funded by **Philip Morris Europe, British American Tobacco** and **Rothmans**.⁶² Soon after the results were released, **Philip Morris Europe** bought full-page newspaper ads claiming that inhaling secondhand smoke is less harmful than drinking two glasses of milk a day.⁶³
- The industry constantly lodges complaints against researchers who expose the dangers of smoking and against the bodies funding their studies. It is currently backing a public campaign to cut the funding granted by the *National Cancer Institute* to Dr. Stanton Glantz, who heads the studies on the **Brown & Williamson** documents⁶⁴ (see Section 1).
- **Philip Morris** has spent more than \$1 million funding the magazine **Healthy Buildings International**. This organization, which describes itself as impartial consultants on indoor air quality, uses phony science to promote the tobacco industry's idea that indoor smoking bans are unnecessary. It is the industry's main "scientific" source on this issue.⁶⁵
- To keep its scientific studies confidential, **Brown & Williamson** has for years sent its research findings to its lawyers. The company then contends that the studies are protected from disclosure in court because of attorney-client privileges.⁶⁶

⁵⁴ *Engagement communautaire*, Imasco Ltd., 1994.

⁵⁵ Marshal, E., "Tobacco Science Wars," *Science* (Journal of the American Association for the Advancement of Science), April 1987.

⁵⁶ Stauber, J. and S. Rampton, *Smokin'!*, Internet, November 22-29, 1995; *Tobacco Control*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1994.

⁵⁷ Wiener, John, "The Cigarette Papers," *The Nation*, January 1, 1996.

⁵⁸ Replace, J. and A. Lowrey, "Issues and Answers Concerning Passive Smoking in the Workplace: Rebutting Tobacco Industry Arguments", *Tobacco Control*, 1 : 208-219, 1992.

⁵⁹ Stauber, J. and S. Rampton, *Smokin'!*, Internet, November 22-29, 1995; *Tobacco Control*, Vol. 3, No. 3, Fall 1994.

⁶⁰ Bero, L. et al, "Sponsored Symposia on Environmental Tobacco Smoke", *JAMA*, Vol. 271, No. 8, 23 February, 1994.

⁶¹ Ecobichon, D. and J. Wu, *Environmental Tobacco Smoke, Proceedings of the International Symposium at McGill University 1989*.

⁶² Reuter, *Journal de Québec*, May 14, 1996.

⁶³ Advertisement appearing in *Le Monde*, June 6, 1996.

⁶⁴ Marshal, E., "Tobacco Science Wars," *Science*, April 1987; Wiener, John, "The Cigarette Papers," *The Nation*, January 1, 1996.

⁶⁵ Kaplan, Sheila, "Tobacco Dole," *Mother Jones*, May-June 1996; Americans for Nonsmokers' Rights, "Tobacco Industry Front Groups," October 1995.

⁶⁶ "Special communications", *JAMA*, Vol. 274, No. 3, July 19, 1995.

8) RECRUITING KIDS AND TEENAGERS:

Even today, tobacco manufacturers "vehemently, unequivocally and unilaterally deny any youth-directed marketing efforts".⁶⁷ But their own documents show this to be false.

- To devise their advertising strategies, Canadian manufacturers **Imperial Tobacco** and **RJR** have conducted extensive research on various target youth segments, discussing preadolescents as young as 11 years of age.⁶⁸
- The industry privately concedes that its future depends on recruiting young smokers ("If the last ten years have taught us anything, it is that the industry is dominated by the companies who respond most effectively to the needs of young smokers") and that its advertising campaigns are designed to respond to the psychological profiles of young people who are susceptible to start smoking.⁶⁹
- To promote its products, the industry has signed deals with movie stars idolized by young people. For example, **Brown & Williamson** paid Sylvester Stallone \$500,000 to smoke its cigarettes in five of his movies, including *Rambo*.⁷⁰ Meanwhile, **Philip Morris** invested \$350,000 to have Sean Connery, as *James Bond*, smoke in at least one movie.⁷¹ Paul Newman and Clint Eastwood are other stars who have personally benefited from the placement of tobacco products in their films⁷².
- After automobiles, cigarettes are the most heavily advertised consumer product in North America,⁷³ with an annual budget of \$6 billion in the United States⁷⁴ and \$80 million in Canada.⁷⁵
- This money pays for misleading campaigns centered on values that are attractive to youth (independence, athletic proficiency, slim physique, active living, music, women's liberation, etc.) in order to promote a product that kills half its regular users through addiction to a lethal product⁷⁶.

⁶⁷ *Advertising Age*, 1983.

⁶⁸ Pollay, R.W. and A.M. Lavack, University of British Columbia, "The Targeting of Youth by Cigarette Marketers: Archival Evidence on Trial," *Advances in Consumer Research*, Vol. 20, 1993.

⁶⁹ Pollay, R.W. and A.M. Lavack, University of British Columbia, "The Targeting of Youth by Cigarette Marketers: Archival Evidence on Trial," *Advances in Consumer Research*, Vol. 20, 1993.

⁷⁰ Letter from S. Stallone addressed to *Associated Film Promotion*, April 28, 1983.

⁷¹ Smokefree Educational Services.

⁷² *Tobacco-Free Youth*, Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco, Summer 1994.

⁷³ "Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People," *A Report from the Surgeon General*, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 1994.

⁷⁴ Federal Trade Commission Report to Congress for 1993 Pursuant to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Washington D.C., U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 1995.

⁷⁵ Nesbitt Research, *The Canadian Cigarette Report*, November 1992.

⁷⁶ Editorial, *JAMA*, Vol. 274, No. 3, June 1995.